

# Thoughts on systems competition

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
# Systems raise common tying, foreclose, and efficiency issues

<b>“Collection of two or more components together with an interface that allows the components to work together.” (Katz &amp; Shapiro)</b>	<b>Efficiencies, reduced transaction costs (analogous to the theory of the firm)</b>
	<b>Tying, monopolization</b>
<b>Anything that creates and maintains a boundary and thus an inside/outside dichotomy (Luhmann, Varela)</b>	<b>Foreclosure</b>

# Most systems are open in some respects and closed in others

- Open, standards-based systems (e.g., TCP/IP, Linux, OSS) raise no risk of foreclosure or tying
  - Stronger justification for open systems preference at the infrastructure layer than at the application layer (modifying property defaults)?
- Closed systems may provide stronger innovation incentives for certain products
  - Reduce complexity and stabilize the development environment. Potential for more reliable products (e.g., Sega Genesis, XBOX, “closed loop” car maintenance)
  - Allow for more diverse monetization models
  - Allow for resource focus and faster development (e.g., console v. PC game development)

# Taxonomy of systems competition cases and key normative considerations



- Intrasystem: “To what extent does the platform creator own derivative component markets?”
- External component: “To what extent may the platform provider close a previously open system, appropriating benefits co-created by outsiders?”
- Intersystem: “Should dominant systems be permitted to remain airtight?” (essential facility)
  - Preference for systems-only or “systems plus component competition?”
  - Preference for incremental v. radical innovation?
  - Preference for investment in market expansion v. free riding?

# Systems competition in practice: defensive and offensive uses

- Defense

- In aftermarket cases, defendants often claim that foremarket (i.e., systems) competition constrains their ability to monopolize component markets (lock in exploitation, quality control, price discrimination)

- Offense

- Where there is no stand-alone concern in component markets, plaintiffs may claim effects in a more highly concentrated systems market
- Where two-sided platforms are active in the same space and compete for users on the “free” side, there often is no competition for participants on the “pay” side. Lacking a clear theory of harm, plaintiffs may find it tempting to resort to a more general claim of preserving “systems competition” or “platform rivalry.”

# Easy labels still don't provide ready answers

- The systems label is useful to describe boundaries around components created by combination, contract, IP, and technology
- Normatively, however, nothing definitive follows from the label, other than an indication of the likely “legal neighborhood” (tying, monopolization, RPA)
  - “Systems competition” should be more than a shorthand for a normative preference for deconcentration and preservation of rivalry
- Empirical evidence of actual competition is still indispensable
  - Systems too have sales and marketing departments, discount approval forms, strategic planning sessions, price cuts, and R&D programs. Those realities, not abstract concepts, should guide the antitrust analysis.

# The real stress test for the antitrust laws are ecosystem industries

- Many interactions between multi-sided platforms are so complex and non-linear that even the participants often **lack the ability to predict outcomes** (e.g., Google/DCLK, Yahoo/Google; TradeComet/Google)
- Vast collections of data have thus become a substitute for theory. Instead of creating models about the future, firms accelerate experimentation, observation, and incremental adjustment (rapid evolution).
- Antitrust law, however, relies on predictions for all *ex ante* cases – how can the complexity be reduced?
  - Shift the focus to *ex post* cases?
  - Rules of thumb for “platform diversity”?
  - “Open systems” presumption of legality?
  - “Rapid success without market power” presumption for legality even for closed systems?